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TERM LIMITS
Term Limits, 
the Standing
Committees, and
Institutional
Response
By Matthew C. Moen
Kenneth T. Palmer
Through citizen initiative in 1993, Maine passed a term
limits bill that now prevents legislators with eight years of
consecutive service from seeking reelection. Although touted
as a means of eliminating careerism in public service and as
a means of bringing fresh blood and new policy initiative
to Augusta, many now question whether limits on service
have hampered legislative efficiency through the loss of
experienced leadership and institutional memory. In this
article, Moen and Palmer examine the impact of term 
limits on the legislature’s standing committees. While noting
adverse impacts such as heavier workloads, they also find 
an institution hard at work to adapt, with leadership seeking
new ways to improve operations and to orient new members
to a rapidly changing environment.  
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INTRODUCTION
Term limits are gradually reshaping the MaineLegislature, but in ways that may not be readily
apparent to the casual observer. This article examines
the impact of term limits on our legislature, with a 
primary emphasis on explaining what is occurring 
with the committees, but also mentioning how our 
policymakers are taking constructive steps to adapt 
to the new environment. 
Term limits took root in Maine in 1993, when
voters approved a citizen initiative limiting state legisla-
tors to a total of four consecutive two-year terms. 
The initiative won easily with 159,785 (67%) to
76,732 (33%) votes. This overwhelming margin of
victory mirrored the national average in the eighteen
states where voters passed term limits, but it also 
came in an off-year election when voter turnout was
unusually low (Moen, 2001a). 
With an eight-year limit on consecutive service,
Maine has the most typical term-limits statute. Six
other states share it. Our statute is strict compared to
several states that allow consecutive terms up to twelve
years, but it is lenient compared to seven states with a
lifetime ban on further service. Members of the Maine
Legislature can switch chambers or seek reelection after
sitting out one term. 
Maine was the
fourteenth state to
pass term limits for
state legislators.
However, because
of the retroactive
provision in its 
citizen initiative, 
in 1996 Maine
became the first
state to actually
prevent legislators
in both chambers
from seeking
reelection. It is
therefore on the
cutting edge of
an issue currently
affecting eighteen
states. Lessons
learned here might
be applicable to
other states, espe-
cially those with
citizen legislatures.
TERM LIMITS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Term limits for elected officials are not a new idea.Support for rotation in office can be traced all the
way back to ancient times, and it was part of discus-
sions of democratic theory after the Renaissance. The
struggle over term limits in American history surfaced
as early as the Articles of Confederation, which
restricted members of Congress to three years of
service in any six-year period (Petracca, 1992). At the
Table 1:
Voter Support for State Legislative Term Limits
State Percent Favoring
Wyoming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77.2%
Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.8%
Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.0%
Missouri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.0%
Arizona  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74.2%
Colorado  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71.0%
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.4%
Oregon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.6%
Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68.4%
MAINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.6%
Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.3%
NATIONAL AVERAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.2%
Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67.0%
South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.5%
Arkansas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9%
Idaho  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.4%
Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.8%
Nebraska  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.0%
California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.2%
Utah Legislature Passed
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.
Table 2:
State Legislative Term Limit Provisions
Limitation Consecutive Lifetime
6 House/ Arkansas
8 Senate California 
Michigan
Oregon
8 total Idaho*
Nebraska
8 House/ Arizona Missouri
8 Senate Colorado
Florida
MAINE
Montana
Ohio
South Dakota
12 total Oklahoma
12 House/ Louisiana Nevada
12 Senate Utah
Wyoming
* The Idaho Legislature repealed term limits in 2002.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.
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Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Founding
Fathers discussed but dismissed term limits, believing
that regular elections and an intricate system of checks
and balances were sufficient safeguards. Term limits
never gained broad appeal, other than for single execu-
tives, such as governors or presidents. 
Developments in the twentieth century began 
to alter this equation. In response to the growing
complexity of public policy issues and the growth 
of the federal bureaucracy, the U.S. Congress became
much more professionalized. Members started serving
longer periods of time, with some turning their
congressional service into a lifetime career. The institu-
tion gave itself more resources. Incumbents became
almost guaranteed winners in elections, particularly 
in the U.S. House, where average success rates often
topped 90% in any given election cycle. 
This surge in congressional careerism occurred
during several decades of control by the Democratic
Party in the aftermath of World War II. In the late-
1980s, Republican political consultants began forming
tax-exempt organizations to promote term limits as 
an antidote to both congressional careerism and
Democratic control (Rothenberg, 1992). Term limits for
members of Congress eventually swept through twenty-
three states (including Maine), but they were struck
down in a 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, in
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton [514 U.S. 779 (1995)].
The spillover effect on state legislatures started in
Oklahoma in 1990, when voters passed term limits in
response to a series of state problems and scandals
(Copeland, 1992). Colorado and California followed
suit later that year, and ten more states passed term
limits in the 1992 election cycle. With few exceptions,
the states passing term limits were west of the
Mississippi River and had provisions for direct initiative
in their state constitutions. The only northeastern states
to enact term limits were Massachusetts and Maine.
When the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down
its law, Maine became the only state in the entire
Northeast with term limits. 
That term limits took root in Maine is mildly 
surprising, given the state’s political culture. Our state
has a moderate and consensus-oriented politics, where
citizens are very good about fulfilling their civic obliga-
tions (Palmer, Taylor, and LaBrizzi, 1992). Maine has
only occasionally defeated incumbent members of
Congress, usually providing them such strong levels 
of support that members are free to carve out national
roles. Maine is not “anti-politician” or “anti-govern-
ment” compared to many states. 
The Maine Legislature also has a track record of
reflecting citizen opinion on constitutional amendments
(Palmer and Moen, 1999). It has some of the least
populous districts among the fifty states, so it is unusu-
ally close and responsive to voters. It has the attributes
of a citizen legislature, such as part-time sessions and
modestly compensated members, making it a less
attractive target for reform than its more professional-
ized counterparts. 
Finally, the Maine Legislature had few career
politicians in the years leading up to the 1993 citizen
initiative. Turnover in the legislature typically ranged
from 23%-35% in the election cycles of the 1980s; 
this gave the Maine House the fifth highest turnover 
of the fifty state legislatures, while the Maine Senate
was eighth (Benjamin and Malbin, 1992). To the extent
careerism could be said to exist, it was primarily at 
the leadership level. Some of those serving on the
Legislative Council or as committee chairs had long
service records.  
Why did a citizen initiative pass in 1993? Many
factors probably contributed to it. The economic slump
of the late-1980s and early 1990s created unrest with
government. Miscalculation or misrepresentation of
state finances, in combination with strong partisan
disagreement over worker’s compensation programs
and fiscal priorities, led to a virtually unprecedented
state government shutdown. Involvement of a
Democratic aide in a ballot tampering scandal tarnished
leadership in Augusta. Increasing institutional expendi-
tures caught the attention of state newspapers, and
That term limits took root in Maine is mildly 
surprising, given the state’s political culture.
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resulted in proposals to shrink the total size of the
Maine Legislature to save money. The campaign to
place term limits on the ballot was coordinated by
professional consultants, who had previously run for
political office. An often apolitical Maine philanthropist
generously financed it. The groundwork was already in
place in other states, so term limits simply had to be
adapted to fit Maine. All of those reasons probably
contributed in some measure to support for term limits.
In a broader sense, term limits tapped widespread
cynicism toward government. A test of various explana-
tions found that cynicism was more important than
voter ideology or dissatisfaction with legislative perfor-
mance in explaining why term limits passed in states
where they were considered (Karp, 1995).
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
ON THE MAINE LEGISLATURE
Because Maine was the first state where term limitsprevented incumbents from both chambers from
seeking reelection, it has been discussed as one part 
of comparative state studies. For instance, one scholar
found state legislators in term-limited states are more
likely to run for the U.S. House of Representatives
(Powell, 2000). Another study focused on leadership
noted that the absence of a career ladder makes Maine
susceptible to internal leadership struggles (Drage, et.al.,
2000). A national survey completed before term limits
took effect in any state suggests traditional centers of
legislative power—such as committee chairs and party
leaders—will be less valuable in a term-limited legisla-
ture (Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 2000). Finally, Maine
lobbyists said in a survey that term-limited legislators
were more likely to introduce bills, and less likely to
follow party leaders and standard practices (Thompson
and Moncrief, 2000).
Other research has focused exclusively on the
Maine Legislature. A comparison of bill sponsorship 
in the 112th (1985-1986) and 116th (1993-1994)
legislatures found that sponsorship increased steadily
with seniority, and that institutional workload increased
over time (Bumps, 1994). Later interviews with legisla-
tors uncovered concern about declining institutional
memory (Boucher, 2000). In our previous work (Moen
and Palmer, 2000a; 2000b; forthcoming), we drew a
variety of conclusions:
• Term-limited districts usually elect a member
from the same political party as the member
forced out, with thirty-eight of fifty-two
(73%) House districts and nine of twelve
(75%) Senate districts following that pattern
from 1996-2000. (Of the remaining House
seats, six switched from Democrat to
Republican, while eight switched from
Republican to Democrat; in the Senate, one
switched from Democrat to Republican, while
two switched from Republican to Democrat).
Districts usually remain Democrat,
Republican, or competitive.
• Term limits initially may have helped decrease
the total number of women in the House and
increase the total number in the Senate.
• Cumulative experience among legislative
leaders has dropped precipitously, with a
series of one-term speakers the most obvious
manifestation.
• From 1996-2000, the House lost fifty-three
members with 466 years of cumulative
legislative experience, eight top leaders, nine-
teen committee chairs, and seventeen ranking
members. The Senate lost twelve members
with 142 years of cumulative legislative expe-
rience, four top leaders, three committee
chairs, and five ranking members.
• Bill introductions rose 43% from 1995 to
1999, while carryovers to the Second Session
rose from 101 in 1995 to 315 in 1999.
In addition to those changes, the standing 
committees have been greatly affected by term limits
(Moen and Palmer, 2000a). Since committees are often
the heart of the legislative process, we update and
amplify some of the key areas of committee change in
order to promote better understanding of the changes
occurring within the institution. 
16 ·  MAINE POLICY REVIEW  ·  Spring 2002 View current & previous issues of MPR at: www.umaine.edu/mcsc/mpr.htm
TERM LIMITS
TERM LIMITS AND COMMITTEES
Historically, the standing committees within statelegislatures—as in the Maine Legislature—have
played a fairly modest role in the legislative process.
Their role has stemmed mostly from the part-time
nature of legislative service. Until the 1960s, most 
state legislatures were in session for only a few months
every two years. Members did not have sufficient 
time to develop enough expertise in a policy area to
command respect from the parent chamber. Rather, 
the party caucuses formulated policy. Members of the 
same political party in the House and Senate convened 
at the start of the legislative week to hear leaders
discuss the particular bills they (and other state politi-
cians) favored. The caucuses provided a relatively effi-
cient way to disseminate information to members and
rally support behind desired legislative programs. 
The increasing complexity of state government 
in recent decades has diminished the role of the party
caucus in formulating legislation. More division of
labor became a necessity. While party caucuses continue
to be centers for coalition building, more of the 
actual preparation and consideration of legislation has
fallen to the committees. At the same time, as more
states have moved to annual and lengthier sessions, 
the length of legislative service records has increased. 
More experience among state legislators means 
more expertise in particular areas of public policy.
Acknowledging a new and expanded role for commit-
tees, many legislatures have provided them with more
professional staff aides. 
This change came to the Maine Legislature in
1973, through establishment of the Office of Policy
and Legal Analysis. It housed about a dozen profes-
sional analysts, who assisted with legislation before the
standing committees. An Office of Fiscal and Program
Review also was created to assist the Appropriations
Committee in its examination of the governor’s budget.
Subsequently, the Maine Legislature took other steps to
expand the role of the standing committees. Beginning
in the 1980s, a “fiscal note” estimating the cost of
proposed legislation was attached to most bills. In the
1990s, the Appropriations Committee started
convening a joint meeting with the relevant policy
committee when it examined a specific area of the
executive branch budget, such as education or natural
resources. This change linked the substantive and fiscal
dimensions of policymaking and, at least in theory,
improved standing committee autonomy and expertise.
Another important factor increasing the power 
of committees was a decline in the Maine Legislature’s
historically high rate of membership turnover, which 
in some years exceeded 50%. A core of long-serving
legislators appeared on the scene, the best known of
whom was John Martin. First elected in 1964 from
Eagle Lake, near the Canadian border, Martin ascended
to the Speakership when the Democratic Party won 
a majority in the House of Representatives. He greatly
strengthened the Maine Legislature relative to the 
executive branch, partly by assembling a group of
committee chairpersons with vast experience and
knowledge of state government. The legislature’s
expertise rivaled—and at times exceeded—the
governor and his department commissioners.
By the mid-1990s, however, the term-limits statute
approved in 1993 started to weaken the standing 
committee system. Most notably, the average length 
of service among chairpersons dropped. In one of the
first cycles after term limits passed, the House lost ten
chairpersons and seven ranking members (Moen and
Palmer, 2000b). The concomitant decline in institu-
tional memory seemed to spur a rise in bill introduc-
tions. A less experienced membership was introducing
and handling even more legislation. 
…the term-limits statute approved in 1993
started to weaken the standing committee
system. Most notably, the average length 
of service among chairpersons dropped.
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Partly out of concern with the 
situation facing the standing commit-
tees, the Maine Legislature took steps 
to augment their powers. It began
requiring executive departments to
obtain approval of “major substantive”
rules formulated to implement general
statutes. It transferred the task of period-
ically reviewing the operations of
the executive departments from a single
“sunset” committee to various standing
committees with relevant policy exper-
tise. It set in place a long-range plan-
ning process, with strategic planning
and performance budgeting replacing
the mostly incremental methods of the
past. These changes do not appear very
dramatic because they have not always
been stringently enforced, but they do
represent attempts at meaningful reform,
and they foreshadow other changes for
committees in the era of term limits. 
MEMBERSHIP
The membership on the jointstanding committees frequently
rotates because of the high turnover 
in Maine’s citizen legislature. This was
true even before term limits, but we
might anticipate this pattern has been exacerbated 
in more recent years. Yet the record is mixed. Most of
the decline in experience within the committees has
occurred among the chairpersons. In the early 1990s,
the average House chairperson served eight years on
the committee that he/she headed, while in the 119th
Legislature (1999-2000), the average tenure was less
than four years (Moen and Palmer, 2000b). 
During the 120th Legislature (2001-2002), 
the two chambers showed differences. In the House,
thirteen of seventeen House chairpersons had served
previously on the committee they now headed; four 
of them had previously chaired the committee. In the
Senate, only two chairpersons had served previously on
the same committee. Part of the reason for this unusual
situation was the split partisan division in the chamber
(17-17-1), which caused the Senate to split chairman-
ships between the two parties. A total of nine of the
seventeen Senate chairs in the 120th Legislature were
serving their first term in the Senate. Interestingly, eight
of them had previous experience in the House, and 
six had served on the same committee in the 119th
Legislature as a House member. Senator John Martin
and Senator Kenneth Gagnon headed the Natural
Resources and Taxation committees respectively, as
House chairs in the 119th Legislature, and then as
Senate chairs in the 120th Legislature. 
The Maine Legislature’s use of joint standing 
committees enables term-limited members to win 
election to the other chamber and remain on the same
committee, thereby providing some institutional and
Table 3:
The Joint Standing Committees of the Maine Legislature
Committee Selected Areas of Jurisdiction
Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry agriculture, public lands, animals, forestry
Appropriations and Financial Affairs General Fund budget, fiscal policy, bond 
issues, federal fund allocations
Banking and Insurance banking, financial institutions, insurance,
HMOs, worker’s compensation
Business and Economic Development business practices, professional licensing,
consumer protection, housing
Criminal Justice law enforcement, corrections, firearms
Education and Cultural Affairs elementary through higher education 
Health and Human Services public/mental health, medical, smoking
Inland Fisheries and Wildlife hunting, fisheries, snowmobiles and boats
Judiciary civil and property law, child support,
legal services, judges, human rights
Labor wage laws, unemployment, worker safety 
Legal and Veterans Affairs gambling, campaigns, ethics, veterans
Marine Resources fisheries, aquaculture
Natural Resources air and water, natural resources, waste 
disposal, environmental policy
State and Local Government state government organization, boards,
constitutional amendments
Taxation taxes, property valuation, municipal 
revenue sharing
Transportation transportation, construction, vehicles
Utilities and Energy utilities, telecommunications, nuclear 
power, energy conservation
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policymaking continuity. Yet term limits have also
created some peculiar situations, such as the sitting
House and Senate chairpersons of the Utilities and
Energy Committee being forced out just as Maine 
was moving toward energy deregulation (“Coming to
Terms,” 2000).
Decline in aggregate experience on committees 
is less evident among the rank-and-file because of a
steady turnover in the citizen legislature and the regular
migration of members from one committee to another.
To the extent change is occurring within committee
ranks, it may be affecting the powerful and prestigious
committees somewhat disproportionately. This is not
surprising, since more senior members can be routinely
expected to serve on the most important committees.
But the extent to which this has occurred is striking.
The Appropriations Committee, for instance, lost six 
of thirteen members because of term limits in the
118th and 119th legislatures. The Committee on Rules
and Business of the House—composed of chamber
leaders from both parties—lost a total of five members
during the same period. No other standing or select
committee lost more than two members to term limits.
The loss of experienced people on the key committees
suggests they may have struggled more initially, but
that other committees are following suit. 
WORKLOAD
The workload of the standing committees underterm limits increased sharply after term limits went
into effect, with the total number of bills referred 
to committees increasing by 43% from 1995 to 1999
(Moen and Palmer, 2000b). However, in the first 
session of the 120th Legislature, bill introduction
declined. It fell from a high point of 2,258 bills in the
first session of the 119th Legislature (1999) to 1,831
bills in 2001, thus returning to the levels it had
reached in 1997. More bills are now being introduced
than before term limits, but the dramatic increases of
the first years of term limits seem to be leveling off.
Generally, this increase was explained by “repeater” 
bills being introduced by new members, who may be
unaware of the legislative histories in particular policy
areas, and by legislators seeking to establish a record 
of legislative success in their first term. 
The rise in the number of bills under term limits
burdens the committees because of joint rules requiring
them to report all legislation; still, the burden may not
be spread evenly across seventeen standing committees.
In order to better understand possible variation across
the committees, we examined individual committee data
compiled by the Office of Policy and Legal Analysis 
for the first session of the 117th (1995), 118th (1997),
119th (1999), and 120th (2001) legislatures.
About the only pattern emerging is that most 
of the committees had a fairly steady increase in bills
received from the 117th to the 119th (1995-2000)
legislatures, followed by a drop in the 120th
Legislature (2001-2002). A striking but also typical
example is the Taxation Committee. It received 135
bills in 1995, 181 in 1997, and 251 in 1999, before
falling to 157 bills in 2001. Health and Human
Services is the only committee where the number of
bill introductions rose over four successive legislatures.
Earlier examination of the 117th to the 119th legisla-
tures (1995-2000) suggested that some of the more
narrowly focused and fiscally oriented committees were
experiencing the greatest increases in workload, but
that notion is dispelled by the more recent data (Moen
and Palmer, 2000b).
Next, we examined the disposition of bills. Under
the rules, standing committees may issue any one of
three unanimous reports: ought-to-pass (OTP), ought-
to-pass as amended (OTP-AM); ought-not-to-pass
(ONTP). In recent sessions between 80-85% of all
committee reports have been unanimous, and there has
been little change under term limits in the types of
Table 4:
Bill Disposition in the First Regular Session, 1995-2001
Legislature 117th 118th 119th 120th 
(1995) (1997) (1999) (2001)
Bills Referred to Committee 1550 1871 2224 1789
Bills Reported Out of Committee 1449 1701 1909 1667
Bills Carried Over to Second Session 101 170 315 122
Source: Office of Policy and Legal Analysis, Maine Legislature.
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unanimous reports sent forward. About 6-7% of all
bills in committee received an OTP recommendation,
while 27-29% received an OTP-AM recommendation.
The percentage of bills receiving an ONTP recommen-
dation edged up from 42% to 48% between 1995 and
1999, but then dropped back to 45% in 2001. Most 
of this increase in ONTP recommendations came 
in Banking and Insurance,
Education and Cultural Affairs,
and Taxation. Overall, the
committees are filtering out a
marginally higher percentage 
of legislation.
One interesting change
that has occurred involves bills
carried over to the second
session. Committees may carry
over a bill when it is introduced
too late in a session to hold 
a public hearing, when its
complexity requires study of
the issue between the regular
sessions, or when it is so
controversial that additional
hearings are desirable. The
historic and theoretical practice
of the Maine Legislature has
been to use a shorter second
session to process new business,
rather than to carry over
previous business. 
Carryovers rose in real and
proportional terms in the after-
math of term limits. In 1995, 
a total of 101 bills (6.4%) were
carried over to the second
session; in 1997, that figure rose to 170 (8.9%), and in
1999 it rose again to 315 (14%). Those figures signaled
an increasingly overburdened committee system.
However, in 2001 the pattern shifted. The number of
bills carried over dropped to 122 (6.6%), a figure more
in line with the volume of bills the legislature typically
carried over before the advent of term limits. Securing
such a reduction was a priority of the legislative leader-
ship in the first session as it sought to cope with the
new burdens imposed on the committees. An important
mechanism in reducing the volume of carryovers was
the legislature’s Office of Policy and Legal Analysis,
which provided regular and very detailed data to the
leadership, such as the number of bills reported out 
of committees, scheduled for hearings, and referred 
to committees but not yet scheduled.
Table 5 lists in descending order the standing
committees with the highest carry over rates in the 
first session of the 119th Legislature (1999), and the
comparable figures for the first session of the 120th
Legislature (2001). The Committee on Business and
Economic Development tops that list, carrying over
twenty-nine of its 107 (27%) bills in 1999. Several 
of the proposals left unresolved in that regular session
augured significant state policy changes, including bills
Table 5: Carryover Bills by Standing Committee*—
First Session of the 119th (1999) and 120th (2001) Legislatures
Committee 119th 120th 
Referrals Carryovers Referrals Carryovers
Business and Economic Development 107 29 (27%) 89 8 (9%)
Labor 136 32 (24%) 117 9 (8%)
Legal and Veterans Affairs 126 27 (21%) 121 4 (3%)
Judiciary 154 29 (19%) 122 7 (6%)
Health and Human Services 157 27 (17%) 170 16 (9%)
Inland Fisheries and Wildlife 124 21 (17%) 86 6 (7%)
Criminal Justice 150 23 (15%) 122 8 (6%)
Natural Resources 75 11 (15%) 70 3 (4%)
Banking and Insurance 116 12 (10%) 101 6 (6%)
State and Local Government 133 13 (10%) 89 6 (7%)
Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry 96 9 (9%) 73 4 (6%)
Transportation 143 13 (9%) 124 2 (2%)
Education 134 12 (9%) 124 9 (7%)
Marine Resources 70 6 (9%) 56 3 (5%)
Utilities and Energy 80 6 (8%) 56 4 (7%)
*Table excludes the Appropriations, Financial Affairs and the Taxation committees.
Source: Office of Policy and Legal Analysis, Maine Legislature.
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to reduce unsolicited communi-
cation over the internet (L.D.
952), establish enterprise zones
in area of high unemployment
(L.D. 1895), and enhance
economic development in
general areas and specific
communities of the state, such
as Cumberland County and
Lewiston/Auburn. The
Committee on Labor had the
next highest carry over rate in
1999, with 24% of its bills
pushed into the second session.
Many of its bills were contro-
versial. They included measures
to increase the minimum wage
in Maine (L.D. 1262), limit
mandatory overtime (L.D.
1019), prohibit the hiring of
replacement workers during
strikes (L.D. 136), and create 
a commission to study the 
hearing processes of the
Worker’s Compensation 
Board (L.D. 1357).
Few major policy measures
were left for consideration at
the close of the first session of
the 120th Legislature in 2001.
Every committee had kept its
carryover bills to fewer than
10% of its total workload. The
committees with the highest
rates of carryover in 1999
showed the greatest improve-
ments in 2001. That commit-
tees exhibited a more uniform
pattern in 2001 implies the
leadership paid close attention
to committees facing special
difficulties, pushing them to complete most of their
work in the regular session.
Term limits may be driving down the proportion
of bills enacted into law. In the first session of the
117th Legislature (1995), 38% of bills introduced were
enacted. That figure dropped to 37% and then to 30%
in the first sessions of the 118th (1997) and 119th
(1999) legislatures, respectively. The figure rose to 
only 32% in 2001. These statistics tacitly support the
argument that rank-and-file members are not having 
an easy time winning approval of their legislation in 
a term-limited environment (Kousser, 2000), but one
must be cautious interpreting the data only that way. 
What can we conclude about workload? Most of
the joint standing committees are processing more bills.
Most of them are recommending proportionally against
more bills than they did before term limits. The
committees are proving to be effective filters, but they
are not faring quite as well in terms of having their
favorable recommendations accepted by the parent
chamber. In short, the committees seem to be working
harder than ever, but with mixed results. Their role
within the institution probably slipped in the early
years of term limits, but they seem to be regaining 
their footing as the leadership focuses on ways to push
and assist them. 
DIVISION
Another possible effect of term limits is that they areincreasing division within the standing committees.
As novices stream into the institution, they may be less
willing to accept traditional political norms of compro-
mise and conciliation; as the experienced members
leave the institution, the norms may not be as easily
transmitted (Moen, 2001b). It is plausible that heavily
burdened committees are more fractured. 
One way to assess division in the committees is 
to look at the number of divided committee reports. 
At first glance, the figures are hardly compelling.
Between 18-20% of all bills coming out of the
standing committees had a divided report in 1995 
and 2001. Yet even if the proportion has stayed about
the same over time, there has been an overall increase
in the number of divided reports, as term limits has
swelled the total volume of legislation. For instance,
divided reports grew from 282 in 1995 to 348 in
1999, before declining marginally to 344 in 2001.
Committees with high numbers of divided reports
…the committees
seem to be
working harder
than ever, but with
mixed results.
Their role within
the institution
probably slipped 
in the early years
of term limits,
but they seem to
be regaining their
footing as the
leadership focuses
on ways to push
and assist them.
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include Labor, Judiciary, Legal and Veterans Affairs, 
and State and Local Government. In those committees,
typically one-quarter to one-third of the reported bills
is sent to the floor of the chambers with a majority 
and a minority report.  
An interesting development under term limits has
been an increase in the number of times where a single
member of a committee recommends that a bill “ought-
to-pass.” This seemingly trivial matter 
is highly significant in the Maine
Legislature because of its egalitarian and
participatory practices. Under legislative
rules, almost every bill receives a public
hearing. When a bill is introduced and
referred to a committee, the House and
Senate co-chairs meet with a staff
member from the Office of Policy and
Legal Analysis (or the Office of Fiscal
and Program Review in the case of the
Appropriations and Taxation commit-
tees) to plan a hearing, usually within a week or two. 
A fiscal note is prepared. A typical hearing lasts one to
two hours, although it may last all day on a major bill.
If the committee unanimously rejects the bill, it will be
disposed of quickly. However, if even one member
favors the bill, additional time will be given to it.
Committee members will direct questions to the staff
member, who writes a report that summarizes testi-
mony, current law in Maine, and conveys what other
states are doing in that policy area. Still more work will
be required to put the bill into final form, and to allot
it time on the floor. Under the legislature’s egalitarian
practices, in other words, even bills favored by only one
member of a committee will consume the institution’s
scarce resources. 
In 1993, the year that the term limits referendum
passed, a total of thirteen bills were reported out of
committee that were favored by only one committee
member. In 1999, a total of fifty-eight such bills were
introduced and referred to committee, and then
reported out. The Committee on Legal and Veterans
Affairs handled some of them, including measures to
limit lobbyists to eight hours of lobbying per month
(L.D. 295); allowing the sale of liquor before 9:00 a.m.
on Sunday mornings (L.D. 865); allowing the purchase 
of wine through the mail (L.D. 1211); and directing 
the Maine Emergency Management Agency to establish
a food assistance program in anticipation of the Y2K
problem (L.D. 1775). The Committee on State and
Local Government reported out one-member OTP 
bills proposing a repeal of daylight savings time 
(L.D. 25); perfecting recall provisions for county and
municipal offices; and authorizing Sly Brook to secede
from the town of Eagle Lake (L.D. 1986). The
Committee on Transportation reported out one-
member OTP bills prohibiting the use of cellular
phones in moving vehicles (L.D. 81); requiring 
inspection stations to carry forms of liability insurance
(L.D. 1138); and allowing motor vehicle inspection
stations to set their own fees (L.D. 282). None of the
measures were enacted at the time. 
We mention some of the specific proposals coming
out of the committees with the most one-member
committee report recommendations in 1999 to illus-
trate the difficulties facing the Maine Legislature under
term limits. More rookie legislators are introducing
more bills. More instances are arising where the entire
legislature has to consider a bill favored by only one
member on a committee. This appears to be a contin-
uing problem. In 2001, even with fewer bills intro-
duced and reported from the committees, the number
of one-member committee reports dropped only
slightly, to forty-nine.
Interestingly, one-member committee reports
appear to have a partisan twist. Analysis of the 1999
bills showed that House Republicans most frequently
cast the single affirmative vote, thereby rescuing bills
from legislative oblivion. In the 1999 session, for
More instances are arising where the entire legislature
has to consider a bill favored by only one member on 
a committee. This appears to be a continuing problem.
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instance, House Republicans made thirty-six of the
fifty-eight one-member committee reports. In contrast,
House Democrats used the procedure only thirteen
times. (Senators cast the other one-member committee
reports.) This partisan difference implies that commit-
tees are less able to achieve unanimity in their ranks,
but also that the hold of the majority party leaders 
is still strong. House Democratic leaders apparently 
succeeded, at least in 1999, in limiting one-member
committee reports.  
CONCLUSION
Observers of American legislatures have long recognized the most critical work in a legislative
assembly often occurs in its standing committees. That
consideration is especially relevant in an era of term
limits. Research suggests that a large influx of new
members has translated into more bill introductions,
and that expert screening of bills by the committees is
more necessary than ever if legislatures are to complete
their work. If the committees are unable to deal effec-
tively with their responsibilities, the vitality of the 
institution is diminished, as is its role vis-à-vis the 
executive branch. In contrast, strong committees might
promote some of the touted benefits of term limits,
such as providing new perspectives on solutions to state
problems, without diminishing the overall strength 
of the institution. 
Our examination of the standing committees 
of the Maine Legislature in the era of term limits leads
to two general conclusions. One is that committees are
in a state of flux. They have experienced rapid
membership turnover, resulting in less collective exper-
tise on key committees and among the senior ranks 
of all committees. They face a heavier workload than
before term limits, and more challenges in successfully
completing their work during regular sessions. They
appear less successful in the parent chamber, and by
some measures, less able to reach agreement. By the
same token, the committees and the leaders are dili-
gently responding to the institutional issues raised by
term limits. Changes already outlined in this article
partly show how the Maine Legislature is adapting to
the new environment. 
A second conclusion is that considerable variation
exists across the committee structure. The membership
of the most important committees, for instance, 
has been altered by term limits more than the other 
committees. Bill introductions rose steeply for several 
sessions in committees such as Taxation, while rising
and falling in committees such as Utilities and Energy.
Similarly, the overall increase in divided reports has
been distributed very unevenly, with committees such
as Labor and Judiciary experiencing that increase, 
while committees such as Natural Resources have not.
Likewise, some committees are struggling much more
than others with one-member committee reports.
Fully aware of these emerging issues, the leader-
ship of the Maine Legislature has been examining 
ways to improve operations. In summer 1999, the
Legislative Council created a six-member subcommittee
to consider changes in joint rules that might enable the
standing committees to better cope with the pressures
of term limits. In March 2000, the subcommittee 
issued a report. Among other things, the report called
for a cap on the total number of bills that individual
members could introduce, and for an increase in the
threshold for an “ought-to-pass” recommendation
going to the floor.
The Joint Select Committee on Joint Rules—
composed of five senators appointed by the Senate
President and five representatives appointed by the
Speaker—acted upon the report of the subcommittee.
This group rejected the subcommittee’s recommenda-
tion that bill introductions be limited to twelve per
member during the first session. Instead, it supported
the idea of raising the threshold for “ought-to-pass”
recommendations, calling for two members (rather 
than one) on a committee to support legislation 
before it would be sent to the floor. The full member-
ship of the 120th Legislature, however, rejected the
proposed change.
In a different vein, the Joint Select Committee 
on Joint Rules sought to increase control of the leader-
ship and staff offices over the volume of legislation. 
It recommended that the Revisor of Statutes more
stringently enforce existing provisions to deny requests
to draft bills unaccompanied by “sufficient instructions,
information and data” within a specific time period.
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Careful enforcement of that policy may have
contributed to the overall decrease in the number 
of bills introduced in the first session of the 120th
Legislature (2001). As we noted earlier, the Office 
of Policy and Legal Analysis also provided detailed
information on the progress of legislation through 
the committees. 
The Maine Legislature’s current approach to 
assisting its committees rests upon improvements in the
processing and management of bills, rather than on
restricting the opportunities of members to offer and
debate legislation. This strategy is consistent with
Maine’s participatory political culture. Taken together,
the various reforms and initiatives show an institution
working hard to adapt to the new environment
brought about by term limits.  
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